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Abstract
We analyze the long-term workforce composition when the quality
of mentoring available to majority and minority juniors depends on
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Introduction

Mentor relationships arise more readily between members of the same race,
gender or other socioeconomic group. This can discourage young adults from
selecting professions with few same-group mentors. As today’s graduates turn
into tomorrow’s mentors, this effect persists and may exacerbate over time.
The resulting labor force participation is suboptimal because young adults do
not internalize the social benefit they create by becoming a future mentor.
Affirmative action policies may reduce inefficiency, but what does the optimal
workforce look like and how persistent does the policy need to be?
Motivated by this question, we provide a dynamic labor market framework
to study inter-generational mentoring and its impact on labor force composition and total welfare. Our model builds on the following empirical findings:
First, mentoring relationships are stronger between members of the same demographic group. Dreher and Cox Jr. (1996) find that female MBA students
and MBA students of color are less likely to form mentoring partnerships with
white men, and Ibarra (1992) finds differential patterns of network connectivity
across genders. Second, the lack of similar role models affects the academic
performance and labor market outcomes of minority students in ways that
cannot be explained by differences in innate ability. This is why same-group
teachers lead to a boost in student performance and graduation rates (Bettinger and Long, 2005; Dee, 2004, 2007; Fairlie et al., 2014). Third, these
achievement differences arise early on and manifest themselves through different education choices. For instance, the undergraduate student body for
economics has roughly the same composition as the academic workforce, indicating that the selection stems from education choices rather than differential
attrition patterns (Bayer and Rouse, 2016).
We study labor force evolution when it is governed by workers’ education
decisions. The cost of education is dictated by idiosyncratic talent and the
availability of mentors of the same group. However, juniors only account
for the mentoring they receive, not the mentoring they provide for the next
generation. Wages do not restore dynamic efficiency, because competition
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and free entry prevents firms from internalizing the effect of today’s hires on
tomorrow’s candidate pool. As a result, the long-run labor force composition
can be inefficient.
With the following example, we highlight some driving forces in our general
model and illustrate two of our key results: First, we show that the share of
minority workers in the welfare-maximizing labor force can be higher than in
the overall population. Second, we argue that the optimal intervention in such
a situation is persistent.
Motivating example. A population is comprised of overlapping generations. Each generation consists of 80% majority group members (i = 1) and
20% minority group members (i = 2). One fourth of each group are of high
talent (H), the remainder are of low talent (L). Each individual lives for two
periods. In the first period, each individual (junior) may invest into costly education. In the second period, educated individuals (seniors) produce a surplus
of one, which they receive as a wage. From the senior workforce, ten leaders
are drawn at random and serve as mentors to currently enrolled juniors.
Low-talent individuals incur a private cost of c for education, high-talent
individuals incur no cost. Each student also receives a mentoring payoff of 1 if
at least one leader is from his own group.1 However, the education decision is
made before the identity of the mentors is revealed. As a result, a low-talent
individual invests if and only if the expected mentoring boost of 1 − (1 − φi )10
is large enough, or equivalently, when his own group makes up a large enough
fraction φi of the senior labor force. We set the cost of education to c =
2 − 0.6510 ≈ 1.987, so that in an unregulated market, juniors invest whenever
their group makes up at least 35% of the senior workforce. High talent workers
always invest in education, and indeed this is socially optimal.
We are interested in steady state workforce compositions where the pool
of educated seniors equals the pool of students who invest. Table 1 reports
the composition of four candidate workforces. Without intervention, compo1

For simplicity, we assume that the mentoring benefit is realized even if the cost of
education is zero.
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Composition

(i)

(ii)

Majority participation
Minority participation

H
•
•

L
•

% majority workers
Total surplus

94%
1.92

H
•
•

(iii)

L H
•
•

80%
1.98

L
•
•

80%
1.95

(iv)
H
•
•

L
•

50%
2.01

Table 1: Motivating Example. The table reports the share of majority workers
and the resulting surplus if the population segments indicated by •
participate in the workforce.
sition (i) describes the only steady state where all investment decisions are
individually rational. This composition excludes low-talent minority workers
from the workforce. One could argue this is not a fair market since individual
career outcomes favor the majority, even though there are no ex-ante talent
differences across groups. Equity concerns may thus justify a policy intervention to reach a ‘fair’ composition such as (ii) or (iii). By either raising tuition
for group 1 or lowering tuition for group 2, the policy maker can make these
compositions individually rational. Perhaps surprisingly, welfare maximization
motivates even starker interventions. Total welfare accounts for the mentoring
externalities that workers exert on both low- and high-talent juniors; it is computed as the sum of aggregate output (or wage) plus any mentoring benefits
net of education costs.2 In this example, welfare is maximized in composition
(iv), where the minority is over-represented in the workforce, resulting in a
50-50 split of the workforce at any point in time. To achieve this composition,
the policy maker needs to modify the participation incentives of the majority
through targeted interventions.

Our general model also considers populations comprised of two groups and
the cost of education as a function of innate talent and mentoring quality.
However, we assume a continuous talent distribution and allow for other men2

If there P
are Hi high- and Li low-talent group-iPworkers, total welfare is given by aggre2
2
Hi +Li
)10 )
gate output i=1 Hi + Li plus mentoring benefits i=1 (Hi + Li )(1 − (1 − H1 +H
2 +L1 +L2
net of education costs (L1 + L2 )c.
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torship functions that can be micro-founded in various ways.
The key parameters in our model are talent dispersion, mentor capacity
and majority share. Talent dispersion measures the concentration of talent
in the population. If all individuals have equal talent, the dispersion is zero.
High-skill sectors (doctors, lawyers, professors) have high talent dispersion.
We assume no ex-ante differences in talent distribution across the two groups.
Mentor capacity captures the average number of mentees reached by a single
mentor or, as in our initial example, the likelihood that a given senior becomes
a mentor. This parameter is determined in practice by the type of mentor
interaction: Capacity is high for classroom instruction but low for one-onone coaching or when only a small fraction of seniors serve as role models or
mentors. Finally, majority share refers to the percentage of majority group
members in the overall population. The share is roughly 0.5 in the case of
gender and larger in the case of race in the United States, where around
76.5% of the population is white.3
Investment in education is generally inefficient. A temporary intervention
can move the economy from one steady state towards a more efficient one, as
long as it is strong enough to affect convergence. However, if the magnitude
of the intervention is too small, then the impact of a temporary intervention
can be short-lived. For example, Bettinger and Long (2005) found that the
positive effect of female instructors disappeared in some male-dominated fields.
Similarly, Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) show that political parties that were
least affected by a gender-employment quota in Spain did not benefit in the
long run. In order to identify the best temporary intervention, we thus compare
total welfare generated at different steady states. We find that for sufficiently
high mentor capacity or talent dispersion, the optimal stable steady state
is such that top talent from both groups participate in the workforce. In
sectors with high talent dispersion, the economy naturally converges toward
this composition; but temporary affirmative action is warranted in sectors with
low talent dispersion where mentor capacity is high and the initial workforce
3

See U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts, as retrieved from https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI125216 on 09/04/2019.
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composition is nearly homogeneous. Undergraduate college education is such
an example where classroom instruction allows for a high ratio of mentees per
mentor, and learning relies on a broad set of skills. Thus, it may not be a
coincidence that university admissions belong to the most visible Affirmative
Action policies.
Yet, even the best steady state achieves less than maximal total welfare.
We show that the optimal workforce over-represents the minority when the two
population pools are of uneven size and mentor capacity is large. Consequently,
a patient planner should persistently intervene in favor of the minority in many
cases.
These policy implications are qualitatively different from those motivated
by fairness, whose objective is ‘equal opportunity for equal talent’ regardless
of group membership. This distinction is important because fairness was the
main driver behind the initial affirmative action movement, and its vocabulary
has since been adopted by the movement’s opponents (Leonhardt, 2012). If
fairness is the objective, affirmative action is primarily a remedy to historical injustice, and should render itself obsolete in a short time. Echoing this
view, past discrimination takes center stage in the debate surrounding recent
Supreme Court decisions on university admissions (Kahlenberg et al., 2014).
Persistent minority overrepresentation is not a ‘fair’ outcome: A minority
student is in fact ‘over-compensated’ for his lack of suitable mentors relative
to a majority student of equal talent. The crucial point of departure is that
the equality of the two students is fictional under mentoring externalities: The
minority student possesses mentoring skills that do more for future talent recruitment than those of his majority twin. A welfare-maximizing intervention
remunerates him for that valuable skill. In particular, we show that the majority share in the population matters: Gender-based policies eventually become
obsolete even under welfare maximization, but not necessarily those based on
race or other minority characteristics.
Finally, we look at concrete policy instruments. We consider educational
subsidies (scholarships), workplace hiring quotas, and mentor training. In our
framework, the optimal educational subsidies are budget neutral in the long
6

run. Hiring quotas are equally effective only if the competitive environment
allows for group-specific wages. However, when wage disparities are restricted
due to cultural norms or firm-internal politics, hiring quotas cause significant
crowding out of majority workers in the middle of the talent distribution. Because wages remain high, some majority workers keep investing in ex-post
worth-less education and remain unemployed. This can result in strong opposition to hiring quotas among educated majority workers who are excluded
from the labor market. To minimize this job insecurity, our model suggests
that efficient wages under a hiring quota are higher for minority than for majority workers. Wage gaps that favor men are thus particularly harmful if
they persist under hiring quotas, as is the case in Norway (Bertrand et al.,
2014). Finally, we show that a nearly fair labor market emerges both as a
stable steady state and as a close to optimal composition for large mentor
capacity or when mentorship frictions disappear. Thus, the need for market
intervention disappears if mentorship itself can be improved.
Our analysis is meant to be understood within a growing theoretical literature on workforce under-representation. The main takeaway from this literature is that different root causes of the observed hiring imbalance reach opposing verdicts on affirmative action: Under taste-based discrimination (Becker,
1957), affirmative action is essentially a zero-sum game where the benefit to
the minority is offset by a direct utility loss of the majority, as documented by
Besley et al. (2017) for political party leaders. Under statistical discrimination, employment quotas may actually reinforce negative stereotypes against
certain groups (Coate and Loury, 1993; Fang and Moro, 2011; Fryer Jr, 2007).
Indeed, when minority employment is mandated by law, firms may have to
hire minority members even if they are unskilled. This in turn may actually
reduce the minority’s returns to education and thereby further lower equilibrium skill investment. Also, stereotypes are in many cases based on biased
beliefs (Bohren et al., 2018; Bordalo et al., 2019). In the model of Bordalo
et al. (2016), the bias stems from the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1972). If state-mandated diversity hires increase differences in
the observed skill distribution between minority and majority workers, these
7

hires may exacerbate negative stereotypes. Finally, quotas are completely ineffective in altering beliefs when agents infer their personal success probability
from their own group’s employment history as in Chung (2000). We complement this discussion by showing that the benefit of affirmative action policies
are understated and confounded if we ignore tangible mentoring complementarities.
Structurally, our analysis is in line with Ben-Porath (1967) who views human capital as being produced using innate talent and other inputs (which
could be mentoring). Our paper builds on and extends the analysis of Athey
et al. (2000), who study optimal promotion decisions in long-lived firms. We
both assume that seniors offer an additive mentorship boost to juniors of varying talent, and that the size of this boost is increasing in the availability of
same-group mentors. The crucial difference is that we do not assume that
the two population pools are of equal size. This is crucial to obtain policy
recommendations that go substantially beyond fairness concerns, and that require persistent intervention. Furthermore, unequal pools are arguably more
suitable to capture demographic differences such as race or a “glass ceiling effect” in multilevel organizations, which affects optimal promotions (see p.25).
Additionally, our results can be related to group identity norms as in Carvalho
and Pradelski (2018). Contrary to Becker and Tomes (1979), Restuccia and
Urrutia (2004) and Herskovic and Ramos (2017), we abstract away from income differences and focus instead on cultural and gender differences. Their
analysis suggests that affirmative action is most effective if targeted towards
the lower end of the income distribution.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we set up
our model of labor force participation and mentoring, and discuss a range of
parametrizations that demonstrate the versatility of our framework. In Section 3, we analyze the steady states of an unregulated market and compare
the labor force composition between temporary and persistent policy interventions. In Section 4, we contrast specific policy instruments and in Section 5,
we discuss the robustness of our findings. Section 6 concludes by relating our
analysis to the public discourse surrounding affirmative action.
8

2
2.1

Model
General model

We study an overlapping generations model with a unit mass of heterogeneous
agents arriving in each period t ∈ N. Each agent is indexed by a talent x ∈ R
that is continuously distributed according to a cumulative distribution function
F . Each agent belongs to either the majority group i = 1 with probability
b ≥ 0.5 or the minority group i = 2 with probability 1 − b. Group membership
is independent of talent, and we refer to b as the majority share. Hence, the
mass of newly arriving agents with talent greater than x is equal to b(1−F (x))
for the majority group and (1 − b)(1 − F (x)) for the minority group.
Participation in the labor force is voluntary. Upon birth, each agent has the
opportunity to elect an outside option with payoff zero. If an agent participates
in the labor force, he lives for two periods and is called a junior in the first,
and a senior in the second. As a junior, the agent pursues costly education.
As a senior, the agent seeks employment and acts as a mentor for new juniors.
Juniors incur a cost of education, which consists of a fixed cost c > 0
that is reduced both by the junior’s individual talent x and the group-specific
strength of mentoring µi . In a period with mass Li of group-i seniors and `i
of group-i juniors, the mentorship boost µi for group-i juniors is determined
by the mentorship function µ̃(Li , L¬i , `i , `¬i ) ∈ [0, 1]. We introduce generic
structural assumptions in Section 2.2 and demonstrate the versatility of our
framework with parametric examples in Section 2.3.
Seniors seek jobs in a competitive and unsaturated labor market. Earnings
are determined through market forces: We assume that each unit mass of
seniors contribute π units to a firm’s profit flow. Assuming free entry of firms,
the wage in an unregulated labor market is then equal to wi = π for both
groups.
Individual rationality implies that a junior invests in education if and only
if her expected lifetime earnings outweigh the cost of education. For a group-i
junior with talent x who arrives in a period with L = (L1 , L2 ) seniors of group
1 and 2, respectively, and ` = (`1 , `2 ) participating juniors of group 1 and 2,
9

respectively, education is individually rational if and only if
c − x − µ̃ (Li , L¬i , `i , `¬i ) ≤ wi .

(IR)

As in Athey et al. (2000), we assume that there are no complementarities
between talent and mentorship boost, and discuss the implications in Section 5.
Given a senior workforce L, the junior workforce ` corresponds to the mass
of new arrivals for whom (IR) holds, i.e. the solution to
(

`1 =
b (1 − F (c − µ̃(L1 , L2 , `1 , `2 ) − w1 ))
`2 = (1 − b) (1 − F (c − µ̃(L2 , L1 , `2 , `1 ) − w2 ))

(1)

for w1 = w2 = π. In a regulated economy, wages are determined endogenously
(see Section 4). As juniors turn into seniors, the dynamic system of labor force
participation is characterized by Lt+1 = `t .
We are primarily interested in the group representation of a constant labor
force, where Lt ≡ (φL, (1 − φ)L), and refer to φ ∈ [0, 1] as the labor market
composition and L ∈ [0, 1] as its total size. Without intervention, the labor
force is constant only at a steady state where `t = Lt = L̂ := (φ̂L̂, (1 − φ̂)L̂)
solves Equation (1). The steady state is (Lyapunov) stable if for all ε > 0,
there exists a δ > 0 such that if kL0 − L̂k < δ, then kLt − L̂k < ε for all t > 0.
We assume that scaling the entire population has no impact on mentorship
quality, which implies that µ̃ is homogeneous of degree zero,
µ̃(Li , L¬i , `i , `¬i ) ≡ µ̃(kLi , kL¬i , k`i , k`¬i )

∀k > 0.

(M1)

To simplify notation, we then mostly use the one-dimensional restriction µ :
[0, 1] → [0, 1],
µ(φi ) := µ̃(φi , 1 − φi , φi , 1 − φi ),
(2)
to describe the mentorship boost in any constant labor force with an own-group
Li
∈ {φ, 1 − φ}, irrespective of total size L = L1 + L2 .
share φi = Li +L
¬i
A social planner can, in principle, induce any workforce composition and
size, even if it is not a steady state. To determine the socially optimal work10

force composition, we maximize total surplus in a constant labor force. This
welfare metric is relevant for a patient social planner who cannot adjust his
diversity targets over time. Total surplus is measured per generation as total productivity net educational investments. A group-i worker of talent x
generates an individual surplus of π − c + x + µi by participating, and zero
otherwise. Integrating over all agents, the total surplus for a constant labor
force of composition φ and size L yields
Z
S(φ, L) = b


π − c + x + µ(φ) dF (x)

(3)

x≥x̂1

Z
+ (1 − b)


π − c + x + µ(1 − φ) dF (x)

x≥x̂2



L
denote the marginal talent
where x̂1 = F −1 1 − φb L and x̂2 = F −1 1 − 1−φ
1−b
of group 1 and 2 workers, respectively. Perfect competition in the hiring
market ensures that this surplus is entirely captured by educated juniors; their
expected lifetime earnings outweigh their cost of education.
To position our findings within the policy debate around affirmative action,
we formally define a fair labor market of constant workforce (φL, (1 − φ)L) as
one where no individual could be made better off by being born into the other
group, i.e. w1 + µ(φ) = w2 + µ(1 − φ). The labor market is biased towards
the majority (minority) if being born into this group is welfare enhancing,
i.e. w1 + µ(φ) > (<) w2 + µ(1 − φ). We believe that this is how “fairness”
is commonly understood in the public discourse. Finally, we say that a labor
force is dominated by the majority (minority) if more than half of the labor
force belongs to that group, φ > (<) 0.5, and over-represents the majority
(minority when the share of workers belonging to that group is larger than
the corresponding population share, φ > (<) b. Note that whenever b > 0.5,
a labor force can be dominated by the majority yet still over-represent the
minority.
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2.2

Mentorship and talent distribution

We now describe the general structural assumptions that we impose on the
mentorship function and the talent distribution. We illustrate the versatility
of the framework with two concrete parametric examples in Section 2.3.
Mentorship. The mentorship function µ̃ : [0, 1]4 → [0, 1] describes the utility boost µ̃(Li , L¬i , `i , `¬i ) experienced by a group-i junior in a period with
Li (L¬i ) own-group (opposite-group) seniors and `i (`¬i ) own-group (oppositegroup) juniors. We assume that µ̃ is continuously differentiable, and that in
any mixed labor force, an increase in the junior workforce weakly lowers the
quality of mentorship, while an increase in own-group seniors strictly improves
the quality of mentorship,
∂ µ̃
≤ 0,
∂`i

∂ µ̃
≤ 0,
∂`¬i

∂ µ̃
> 0 over (0, 1]4 .
∂Li

(M2)

The sign of ∂ µ̃/∂L¬i can be positive, as would be expected when cross-group
mentorship is effective. However, it could also be negative, when search frictions make it harder to find an own-group mentor in a senior workforce that is
dominated by the opposite group. We only require that adding an own-group
senior is weakly more beneficial than adding an opposite-group senior,
∂ µ̃
∂ µ̃
≥
,
∂Li
∂L¬i

(M3)

and that adding an own-group junior lowers mentoring weakly more than an
opposite-group junior,
∂ µ̃
∂ µ̃
≤
.
(M4)
∂`i
∂`¬i
To determine how specific features of the mentorship function affect the labor force composition, it is useful to consider a family of mentorship functions
{µ̃q } identified by a single parameter q > 0 which we call the mentor capacity.
The mentor capacity affects both the total and the marginal strength of mentorship. Letting µq denote the one-dimensional restriction of µ̃q according to
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Equation (2), we assume that the mentorship boost µq (φ) in any mixed labor
force φ ∈ (0, 1) is pointwise increasing in q and satisfies the limits
lim µq (φ) = 0,

q→0

lim µq (φ) = 1,

q→∞

and

lim µ0q (φ) = 0.

q→∞

(M5)

In other words, high mentor capacity ensures a near-maximal mentoring boost
at all representations φ ∈ (0, 1). Letting
Mq (φ) := φµq (φ) + (1 − φ)µq (1 − φ)

(4)

denote the total surplus generated by mentorship, we assume that for any
φ > 0.5, there exists Qφ ∈ R such that
Mq0 (φ) < 0

∀q ≥ Qφ .

(M6)

This assumption plays a key role in resolving the tension between talent and
mentoring. It ensures that talent is the deciding factor for large enough mentor
capacity, and skews the composition that maximizes mentorship surplus Mq (φ)
towards 0.5. We leave it to the parametric examples in the next section to
convince the reader that the condition holds under a wide range of mentorship
mechanisms.
Finally, to discuss stability, we need a technical condition that for all mentor capacities q the partial derivatives converge at comparable rates. Formally,
we assume that for any δ > 0, there exists a bound Kδ > 0 such that
k∇µ̃q (φ, 1 − φ, φ, 1 − φ)k∞ < Kδ µ0q (φ)

∀φ ∈ (δ, 1 − δ), ∀q > 0.

(M7)

This allows us to derive our main results by considering only the one-dimensional
restriction µ rather than the full mentorship function µ̃.
Talent. The cumulative talent distribution function F is continuously differentiable in x with full support over (xF , x̄F ), for some xF , x̄F ∈ R∪{±∞}. For
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realism and tractability, we assume that the range of talent is large enough,
xF > c − π − µq (0.5)

and

xF < c − π − M̄ ,

(F1)


where M̄ = max 1, supφ∈[0,1] Mq (φ) + (1 − φ)Mq0 (φ) < ∞ is determined by
the mentorship function. The first condition ensures that the most talented
juniors have positive individual surplus in a constant labor force with an equal
mass of either group. This is necessary for positive labor supply in any mixed
steady state. The second condition ensures that the least talented workers
have negative individual surplus under any mentoring boost (since µ(φ) ≤ 1
always) and their participation also lowers social surplus. This simplifies some
of the proofs because we do not have to worry about corner solutions, while
no substantive insights are lost.
To determine the role of talent on the labor force composition, it is useful
to consider a family of talent distributions {Fλ } identified by a single parameter λ > 0 which we call the talent dispersion. Talent dispersion measures
the spread of talent in the population, and we assume that the support of
Fλ weakly increases in the set-inclusion sense, with limλ→∞ x̄Fλ = ∞. Consequently, whenever Property (F1) holds for some λ and q, it also holds for all
larger λ0 ≥ λ or q 0 ≥ q, by monotonicity of ~xFλ and µq (0.5). Further, for any
x that is (eventually) inside the support of Fλ , we assume that the hazard rate
converges to zero pointwise,
Fλ0 (x)
= 0.
λ→∞ 1 − Fλ (x)
lim

(F2)

Loosely speaking, this ensures that the upper tail grows fast relative to the
mass of agents with talent near x.

2.3

Parametric examples

There are various sensible assumptions regarding the mechanisms that determine the strength of mentoring, or regarding the talent distribution in the
population. In this section, we present a range of parametric examples that
14

fit our general framework:
Mentorship. Our first example considers matching frictions, that are made
explicit in a discrete matching market.4 We consider random bipartite network between n(L1 + L2 ) seniors and n(`1 + `2 ) juniors. Links are drawn
independently, and represent successful mentoring relationships. Members of
the same group i are linked with probability pii , members of opposite groups
with a lower probability pij < pii . Specifically, each mentor is assigned to q
mentees on average. Parameter q is high for industries where the relevant skills
are imparted through classroom instruction, and low where mentoring requires
individual coaching.5 Out of all mentees, a fraction s ∈ [0, 1) is drawn from
the pool of same-group juniors while the remainder is drawn from the entire
junior population (partial assortativity). A within-group mentor assignment
is always successful, while an across-group mentor assignment only with probability δ ∈ [0, 1) (homophily). Putting these together, the total probability6
for a link between a group-i senior and a group-j junior is equal to

 sq + (1−s)q
pij = n`i n(`1 +`2 )
δ (1−s)q
n(`1 +`2 )

if i = j
otherwise.

4
There is a vast empirical literature on the strong positive effects of same-group role
models and mentors. Notably, the performance gap between white and underrepresented
minority students drops by 20-50 percent in courses taught by a minority instructor (Fairlie
et al., 2014), and one year with an own-race instructor increases math and reading scores by
2 to 4 percentile points (Dee, 2004). These performance boosts are especially pronounced
for minority students of the highest ability levels (Carrell et al., 2010; Ellison and Swanson,
2009). The literature also documents a bias where faculty fails to identify talented minority students (Card and Giuliano, 2016), bases track recommendation on gender stereotypes
(Carlana, 2019) or perceives other-race students as inattentive (Dee, 2005). Similar positive effects arise when schools are segregated by gender (Jackson, 2016), suggesting that
peer effects may amplify such patterns. Fully assortative matching would solve this problem but is rarely feasible, particularly in professions with high degrees of specialization or
geographic fragmentation, where mentor assignment is primarily dictated by expertise or
location. Moreover, if mentoring occurs in groups, assortativity reduces benefits of peer
group diversity and can raise segregation concerns.
5
Decreasing trends in the time invested in mentoring (DeLong et al., 2008) will also affect
market dynamics through this channel.
6
For n large enough, the link probabilities are non-degenerate.
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A junior enjoys a mentorship boost of 1 if and only if he or she is in at least
one successful mentoring relationship. In a very stark fashion, this captures
the idea that there are decreasing returns to scale from mentorship for an
individual junior.
By the Law of Rare Events, the number of mentors per junior can be
approximated by the Poisson distribution as n grows. The success probability
of finding a mentor, and hence the expected mentorship boost for a junior of
group i, converges to
−sq

µ̃(Li , L¬i , `i , `¬i ) = 1 − e

L +δL
Li
−(1−s)q `i +` j
`i
1
2

.

(5)

Figure 1a shows how increasing mentor capacity (q ↑), improving across-group
mentoring (δ ↑), or increasing assortativity (s ↑) impacts the shape of the mentorship function µ̃. Note that (M4) is satisfied since assortativity is imperfect
(s < 1), and (M3) is satisfied since group-match matters (δ < 1).
Our second example expands upon the example in the introduction, and
views mentors primarily as role models.7 Formally, we assume that in every
generation q leaders are randomly appointed, and serve as role models for
juniors. The number of group-i role models is thus distributed according to
a Binomial distribution with success probability Li /(L1 + L2 ). A junior with
k ∈ N0 same-group role models enjoys a mentorship boost of 1 − δ k for some
δ ∈ [0, 1). This incorporates a more subtle version of decreasing returns from
mentoring, and approaches the binary version from above when δ → 0. The
expected mentorship boost to a group-i junior is then equal to

µ̃(Li , L¬i , li , l¬i ) = 1 −

δLi + L¬i
Li + L¬i

q
.

(6)

Figure 1b shows how increasing the number of leaders (q ↑) or weakening the
decreasing returns (δ ↑) impacts the shape of the mentorship function µ̃. Note
7

Role models are important as documented for example in Kofoed et al. (2019) who find
that cadets are more likely to pick their officer’s branch if they have the same gender or race.
Similarly, Porter and Serra (2019) find that female economics students who are exposed to
female role models are more likely to choose economics as their major.
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(a) random assignment of mentors

1

ϕ

(b) random appointment of role models

Figure 1: Parametric mentorship functions. Solid lines indicate mentor functions for q = 2 (yellow), q = 5 (blue) and q = 20 (pink) with
δ = s = 0. Increasing δ or s lowers the slope and curvature of the
mentoring function as indicated by the dashed lines.
that (M3) is satisfied because returns from additional mentors are decreasing
(δ < 1).
We share the term ‘role models’ with Chung (2000), but we reach different
conclusions because of different assumptions on the benefits that juniors reap.
In Chung (2000)’s model, the only information learned from a role model is
whether “someone like me” can succeed in a world that is static. In temporarily
lowering the hurdles for one group, affirmative action makes their success less
meaningful to post-policy juniors. As also acknowledged by the author, we
believe this is a narrow view of what role models do. They teach us not only
if, but also how “someone like me” can succeed. There is actual, group-specific
knowledge created when people from one’s own group get to participate in the
labor force. Second, the value of role models goes beyond mere information.
Role models are also trail blazers, who transform the working culture into one
that is more welcoming for successors like them.
Talent. In terms of the talent distribution, our results are driven by the
talent dispersion λ. High talent dispersion means that a small elite possesses
abundant talent, low dispersion reduces this heterogeneity. In applications, λ
is particularly large for specialized education that requires rare skills, such as
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for doctors, lawyers or actors.
Formally, we only require the conditions discussed in Section 2.2. Practically, we are mainly interested in families of distribution where the mean
talent is constant while the variance increases with λ. Good candidates are
the normal distribution with any fixed mean and variance λ, the gamma distribution with fixed mean and scale parameter λ or the uniform distribution
over (−λ, λ). However, the results also apply when dispersion increases along
with the mean. For instance, talent could be determined by the sum of k
different skills, each exponentially distributed with mean λ, which would then
yield a Gamma distribution with rate parameter k and shape λ.
The most striking difference between these families lies in the range of
possible talent. In the normal distribution, talent is unbounded both above
and below. The Gamma distribution imposes a lower bound on talent, and as
λ increases, the likelihood of near-zero talent increases. Finally, the uniform
distribution imposes both an upper and lower bound on talent, but the range
is increasing in λ.

3

Optimal Labor Force Composition

In this section, we determine the labor force composition that emerges in an
unregulated steady state, and then show that the composition is generally suboptimal. Intuitively, mentoring complementarities generate a tension between
talent recruitment and mentoring efficiency: Only a homogeneous labor force
(φ ∈ {0, 1}) ensures perfect within-group mentor assignments, but a mixed
labor force (0 < φ < 1) harnesses the top talent from both groups.

3.1

Steady States of an unregulated economy

In an unregulated economy, each worker earns his marginal product, w1 =
w2 = π. The break-even talent in a steady state of composition φ̂ is given by
x̂1 (φ) := c − π − µ(φ)

and
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x̂2 (φ) := c − π − µ(1 − φ)

for each group i. Property (F1) ensures that both x̂1 (φ) and x̂2 (φ) are strictly
above xF , and at least one of them is strictly below x̄F in a steady state.
This avoids corner solutions where all members of one group participate, or
where no one from either group participates. The assumptions do not rule out
homogeneous steady states where only one group participates, i.e. φ̂ = 0 with
x̂1 (0) > x̄F or φ̂ = 1 with x̂2 (1) > x̄F .
Our first result identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for each type
of steady state, and shows that mixed stable steady state are generally biased
towards the majority. We say that the steady states of an economy tend
toward a finite subset Φ ⊂ [0, 1] as a parameter tends to infinity if and only if
for every δ > 0, all steady states (φ̂, L̂) satisfy min
|φ̂ − φ0 | < δ for sufficiently
0
φ ∈Φ

large parameter values.
Proposition 1 (Steady States). Consider an economy that satisfies Property (F1).
(a) The economy admits two homogeneous steady states φ̂ ∈ {0, 1} if and only
if the most able individuals require some mentorship boost to participate,
c − x̄F − µ(0) ≥ π.

(hSS)

The homogeneous steady states are stable whenever the inequality is strict.
(b) The economy always admits a mixed steady state φ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
(c) If b > 0.5, any majority-dominant workforce converges to a steady state
that is biased towards the majority.
(d) As mentor capacity q → ∞, the economy admits a stable steady state near
b. The steady states of the economy tend towards {0, b, 1}.
(e) As talent dispersion λ → ∞, the economy admits a stable steady state near
b. The steady states of the economy tend towards {b}.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
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We find that when mentoring is required for investment of even the most
educated individuals (hSS), a stable homogeneous steady state exists (claim a).
This is precisely because group-i investment ceases once the group is severely
underrepresented in the workforce.
Every economy also admits at least one mixed steady state, though it
may be unstable (claim b). An economy may admit multiple stable steady
states, including some where the workforce is dominated by the population
minority, φ̂ < 0.5. South Africa is an example that readily comes to mind,
where 80% of the economically active population is Black African, yet they
still hold only 14.3% of top management jobs even over 20 years after the
end of apartheid (BBC News, 2019). Our analysis suggests that mentorship
disparities can sustain such a bias towards the minority indefinitely. Achieving
a fairer market may require active government intervention.
Whenever the majority initially dominates the workforce, however, mentorship frictions invariably push the economy towards a bias in favor of the
majority (claim c). First, we show that a majority-dominant senior workforce
always attracts more juniors of the majority than of the minority. Still, that in
itself does not constitute a bias. Recall that a labor market is fair if the breakeven talent for each group is identical. Because talent is equally distributed,
a fair steady-state labor market with x̂1 (φ) = x̂2 (φ) would therefore mirror
the composition of the population, φ̂ = b. A bias towards the majority means
not just that the majority will always dominate the workforce (φ̂ > 0.5), but
that it will eventually be over-represented (φ̂ > b). We show this by ruling out
any steady states with composition φ̂ ∈ (0.5, b]. To relate this to the example
above, it means that minority dominance never emerges spontaneously, but
is always the result of active interventions that institute minority rule either
by forcing an initial composition φ < 0.5 or artificially skewing the payoffs in
favor of the minority group.
Finally, if either mentor capacity or talent concentration is large, labor
supply hardly responds to differences in mentor availability. If q is large, this
is because even a small representation yields a near-maximal mentorship boost;
if λ is large, this is because there are very few juniors in the middle of the talent
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distribution who could be swayed to participate with mentorship. Thus, for
any interior φ, the ratio of group-1 to group-2 individuals with talent above
x̂i (φ) converges to b : 1 − b, ruling out any other steady states.

3.2

Welfare-maximizing steady state

In a first step, we provide policy recommendations for interventions that are
limited in time. A patient social planner would then redirect the economy
towards the steady state that maximizes surplus. We denote this composition
by φ∗SS .
Proposition 2 (Optimal Steady State). For sufficiently large mentor capacity
q or high talent dispersion λ, the surplus-maximizing (stable) steady state is
nearly fair, φ∗SS ≈ b.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
As mentor capacity increases, even a handful of minority mentors can provide a near-perfect boost to minority juniors. As a result, the efficiency tension resolves in favor of talent recruitment, and surplus is maximized at a
nearly fair steady state. Highly concentrated talent makes all other workforce
compositions unsteady, and so that part of the result follows directly from
Proposition 1(e). In other words, temporary market intervention is warranted
when minority participation threatens to vanish in an industry where mentoring is sufficiently broad and differences in talent are not very pronounced.
This makes sectors with low specialization and mentoring through classroom
instruction (for example undergraduate education) prime candidates for temporary course correction in favor of the underrepresented group.
Still, temporary intervention does not achieve a workforce that accurately
reflects the diversity in the population. Although the mixed steady states tend
towards fairness, the minority remains under represented at the mixed steady
state in the sense that φ̂ > b for any finite q or λ by Proposition 1(c). This
is because minority mentors are harder to come by, making it impossible to
sustain proportional participation without ongoing intervention.
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Figure 2: Social surplus as a function of labor force composition φ.
Figures are obtained using mentorship function (6), uniform talent distribution
U (−1, 1), and parameter values b = 0.7, c = 2.2, π = 1, δ = 0 and q = 5.

3.3

Optimal long-run intervention

Perhaps surprisingly, we now show that an optimal long-term policy often
over-represents the minority. In doing so, we are agnostic about the exact
implementation of the policy goal. We simply assume that the planner can
dictate each individual participation decision, which is equivalent to choosing
the marginal talent of participants in either group. In Section 4, we show that
the optimal policy can be implemented through educational scholarships or
hiring quotas.
Before stating the proposition, it is useful to visualize the surplus function
defined in (3). Figure 2 depicts the maximal surplus across compositions. In
this example, the optimal labor composition is biased in favor of the minority
(φ∗ < b), but the steady state composition is biased in favor of the majority
(φ̂ > b). The surplus generated under the optimal composition φ∗ is 9%
higher than the steady-state surplus. The figure also illustrates that a fair
labor market (with composition b) achieves a near-optimal surplus, and may
be easier to implement for political reasons. The shape of the surplus function
in this example is typical. For small mentor capacity, the optimum is found
at the right boundary (φ∗ = 1). For large mentor capacity, the optimum is
majority dominant but biased in favor of the minority. The next proposition
formalizes these claims.
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Proposition 3 (Optimal Intervention). The optimal labor force composition
φ∗ depends on mentor capacity q as follows:
(a) If c − π > x̄F and q is sufficiently small, a homogeneous labor force is
optimal.
(b) If b > 0.5, the optimal labor force is always dominated by the majority,
φ∗ > 0.5. However, as long as mentor capacity is sufficiently large, q > Q,
the optimal labor force is biased in favor of the minority, φ∗ ∈ (0.5, b).
(c) The optimal composition converges to that of the population limq→∞ φ∗ = b.
For large enough talent dispersion λ, the surplus-maximizing economy is biased
towards the minority (majority) whenever Mq0 (b) < 0 (Mq0 (b) > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
Figure 3 illustrates the different regions described in the proposition by
plotting the optimal composition φ∗ as a function of the mentor capacity q. We
start by observing that whenever there is a population majority, the optimal
labor force is always dominated by that group (see claim b). In the South
Africa example mentioned above, this would motivate an intervention in favor
of the dominated majority.
When the maximal talent is not too high and mentor capacity is small,
we then show that the most efficient labor force excludes the minority (claim
a, region A in Figure 3). Including even just the most talented minority
members dilutes mentoring for the majority, and this effect can outweigh for
small mentor capacities. Note however, that a homogeneous labor force is
never optimal when the upper bound on talent, x̄F , is large enough.
Larger mentor capacities make the mentoring dilution less costly for the
majority. At some point, this implies that the optimal labor market is actually
biased in favor of the minority (claim b, region B in Figure 3), though the size
of the bias disappears in the limit (claim c). In such a market, the policy maker
recruits minority workers with talent below the marginal majority worker – not
just as a transitory course correction, but as an ongoing policy. The stark result
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A

B

Figure 3: Optimal composition as a function of mentor capacity q (solid line).
Stable steady state compositions are indicated with dashed lines.
Figure is obtained using mentorship function (6), uniform talent distribution
U [−1, 1], and parameter values b = 0.7, c = 2.2, π = 1, and δ = 0.

has a simple intuition: Workers don’t internalize their own positive mentoring
externality on future generations. When mentors are efficient (q large), the
social returns warrant minority subsidies that exceed the inherent mentoring
advantage of the majority.
A critical expression that emerges in the proof is whether Mq0 (b) is negative
or positive. This expression can be rewritten as
µ(b) + bµ0 (b) < µ(1 − b) + (1 − b)µ0 (1 − b),

(7)

which compares the mentoring gain from marginal over-representation between
the two groups. An additional majority participant enjoys a mentorship boost
of µ(b) and improves the available mentoring for his entire group of mass b by
µ0 (b). When the marginal returns from mentoring are sufficiently decreasing,
it is more beneficial to instead add an additional minority participant, since
µ0 (1 − b)  µ0 (b). As long as talent is sufficiently dispersed, this is sufficient
to ensure that a minority bias is optimal (claim d).
Since a composition φ ∈ (0.5, b] never emerges in a steady state, Propositions 1 and 3 jointly imply that a sufficiently patient planner intervenes
persistently in favor of the minority in industries where mentoring has sufficiently decreasing returns-to-scale, and individual surplus is primarily driven
by talent rather than mentoring. In particular, there is no reason to assume
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that affirmative action policies render themselves obsolete by virtue of their
own success. This is contrary to the 2003 Supreme Court ruling which argued
that “race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time” and expected
them to disappear within 25 years.8
Proposition 3 also points to differences between race- and gender-based
affirmative action. Since both genders are equally prominent in the population
(b ≈ 0.5), we expect gender-based policies to be necessary only in the short run,
but see grounds for ongoing race-based policies (since b  0.5). In other words:
Extrapolating from a model with equal population pools (Athey et al., 2000)
might lead us to believe that course corrections are not necessary in industries
where skill recruitment dominates mentoring – when in fact these are the
precise situations where surplus maximization requires ongoing intervention.
It is also useful to contrast our results with Athey et al. (2000)’s conjecture
regarding the “glass ceiling effect,” referring to the well-known phenomenon
that group-imbalance increases in higher echelons of the career ladder.9 In
their model, senior management plays the role of a surplus-maximizing social planner. The authors observe that for b = 0.5, a marginal population
increase of one group shifts the optimal labor force composition towards that
new majority. From that, they conjecture that (a) a population increase for
one group shifts the optimal bias towards this group, and (b) representation
inequalities are exacerbated at each level in an organizational hierarchy (Athey
et al., 2000, p.778f). Our analysis warrants a more nuanced view: (a) While a
population increase shifts the optimal workforce representation towards that
group, the bias may actually be in favor of the other group, and (b) faced with
an uneven middle management, optimal promotion decisions at the top may
over-represent the dominated group.10 Thus, mentoring frictions alone do not
provide a persuasive rationale for increasing attrition across echelons of the
career ladder, at least not if promotion decisions are surplus maximizing.
8

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), pages 309-310.
Matsa and Miller (2011) report that women only make up 6% of corporate CEO’s and
top executives, despite representing 47% of the labor force.
10
Moreover, if promotions represent the top end of the talent distribution, there is no
reason to assume any interactions between levels at all.
9
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4

Policy Instruments

We now turn our focus to the practical implementation of a policy that modifies
labor participation. While the previous section determined the socially optimal
workforce L∗ = (φ∗ L∗ , (1 − φ∗ )L∗ ) assuming direct control over the talent


∗
∗
L∗ , here we ask how
cutoffs x∗1 = F −1 1 − φb L∗ and x∗2 = F −1 1 − 1−φ
1−b
the policy maker can implement cutoffs (x∗1 , x∗2 ) using available policy tools.
We compare three methods that can be expressed within our simple model:
group-specific tuition, hiring quotas and mentor training.
Educational incentives. The most direct market intervention modifies the
cost-benefit analysis of prospective students through a combination of groupspecific fellowships and tuition hikes. Let ∆ ∈ R2 denote such a transfer
schedule where ∆i represents the net transfer to individuals in group i. These
transfers are assumed to be available to all interested minority students. It is
straightforward that ability-based fellowships only affect the extensive margin
if the available pool exceeds the unregulated student supply.11 Because the
labor market remains unrestricted, expected returns to education remain equal
to w = π. Equation (1) ensures that participation L∗ is individually rational,
given a status quo labor force (L1 , L2 ), if and only if
∆i = c − π − µ̃(Li , L¬i , L∗i , L∗¬i ) − x∗i

∀i = 1, 2.

After one period of intervention, the status quo labor force becomes L∗ , but
the policy needs to stay in effect since L∗ is generally not a steady state.
We now show that once the surplus-maximizing mixed labor force is reached,
it can be maintained in a way that is budget-balanced. Since there are φ∗
transfers of ∆1 for every 1 − φ∗ transfers of ∆2 , budget balance at L∗ requires
that
0 = φ∗ ∆1 + (1 − φ∗ )∆2 .
11

(8)

This may explain why studies such as Prenovitz et al. (2016) fail to observe additional
minority recruitment for competitive scholarship programs on a limited budget.
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Consider now a change in the constant labor force by a marginal increase in
total size. As long as the labor force composition is maintained, the individual
surplus of any participating workers is unaffected, but the increase adds φ∗ dL
group-1 workers with individual surplus −∆1 and (1 − φ∗ )dL group-2 workers
with individual surplus −∆2 . Since L∗ is chosen optimally, the total effect
must be zero, which implies Equation (8).
Labor Force Quotas. Alternatively, the policy maker can restrict the recruitment decisions of firms by setting caps on the group composition of new
hires. Norway is a prime example of such an approach, since it was the first
country to mandate quotas for managerial boards in publicly listed companies – a sector with high skill concentration. Spain and Iceland have since
implemented similar policies (Egan, 2012). Politicians typically distinguish
between so-called hiring “goals” and more explicit “quotas,” but that distinction is largely semantic from an economic perspective (Fryer and Loury, 2005).
For that reason, we simply impose upper limits on the proportion of majority
group members among all educated new hires.12 We call a quota φ∗ binding
at L if it forces the firm to recruit more minority members than they would
otherwise. Formally, if ` denotes the solution to Equation (1) under wages
1
.
wi ≡ π, φ∗ is binding if and only if φ∗ < `1`+`
2
With a quota, the policy maker controls only the composition of the market, while market forces determine the size of the labor force. We study two
cases, depending on whether the market allows for wage differentials based on
minority membership. We need some new notation since regulation may jeopardize employment security: We denote the mass of educated and employed
individuals by ` ≥ ` respectively. We assume that all educated group members
are equally likely to get hired since firms care only about productivity, so that
the expected earnings under wages wi are equal to `i /`¯i · wi .
When firms can choose wages freely, any oversupply of educated group-i
workers would drive wage wi to zero. As long as the mass of workers willing to
12

Only quotas with restrictions on education can be effective. Otherwise, firms could
always costlessly meet any quota by hiring unqualified minority workers at a wage of zero.
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work at zero wage is small enough, this implies that all educated workers find
employment, `¯ = ` = (φ∗ `, (1 − φ∗ )`).13 Under a binding quota and given a
status quo labor force (L1 , L2 ), the size of the cohort ` and the market wages
wi are then uniquely determined by the market clearing equations




φ∗ ` =
b (1 − F (c − µ̃(L1 , L2 , φ∗ `, (1 − φ∗ )`) − w1 ))
(1 − φ∗ )` = (1 − b) (1 − F (c − µ̃(L2 , L1 , (1 − φ∗ )`, φ∗ `) − w2 ))


π = φ∗ w1 + (1 − φ∗ )w2 .
The first two expressions restate the individual rationality constraints (1).
The third equation is the zero-profit condition for firms with the required
share of minority workers. Note that it is equal to budget balance (8) when
wage bonuses are restated as subsidies ∆ = π − w. This implies that a
binding quota raises minority and depresses majority earnings relative to the
unconstrained market, w1 < π < w2 . Our model does not distinguish between
monetary wages and other job perks; similar effects are obtained if firms offer
benefits that are geared towards the minority. It also implies that the social
planner and the myopic firms agree on the optimal labor size at the surplusmaximizing composition. It may, however, take several generations until the
labor size approaches the optimal level, as illustrated by Figure 4a.
In some industries, social or legal pressure prohibits paying unequal wage
to employees in the same position, w1 = w2 .14 The zero-profit condition forces
these market wages to π. However, a binding quota caps the demand for
φ∗
group-1 workers at `1 = 1−φ
∗ `2 , while all educated minority workers are hired,
`2 = `¯2 . Workers factor this employment insecurity into their participation
13

If there are many majority workers who obtain an education regardless of earnings,
market wages are an insufficient instrument to guide participation decisions. We omit the
formal conditions because we do not think that these offer additional insight into realistic
scenarios.
14
This is the stated rationale behind the presidential memorandum ‘Advancing Pay Equality Through Compensation Data Collection’ (Presidential Memorandum, 79 Fed.Reg. 20751
(Nov.04, 2014), www.federalregister.gov/d/2014-08448). Firms also have internal incentives
to avoid group-specific wages, as pay gaps can have detrimental effects on worker morale
and firm output if the gaps are not easily accounted for by productivity differences (Breza
et al., 2017).
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Figure 4: Labor force evolution starting at the mixed steady state for t = 0,
under a quota that imposes the welfare-maximizing composition.
For each generation, the bars show the mass of minority (black), employed majority (gray) and unemployed majority participants (light
gray). Dotted lines indicate the welfare-maximizing workforce.
Figures are obtained using mentorship function (6), uniform talent distribution
U [−1, 1], and parameter values b = 0.7, c = 2.2, π = 1, δ = 0 and q = 5.

decision, transforming the individual rationality constraints (1) into
(

φ∗ `¯2
`¯1 =
b (1 − F (c − µ̃(L1 , L2 , `¯1 , `¯2 ) − 1−φ
∗ `¯ π))
1
¯
¯
¯
`2 = (1 − b) (1 − F (c − µ̃(L2 , L1 , `2 , `1 ) − π)).

Job insecurity for the majority is the only driver for the change in participation
rates, and so this must occur in equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 4b. In
practice, this means that majority workers waste their own resources on an
ex-post worthless education and dilute mentoring efficiency for everybody else.
Of course, such a feature greatly reduces the appeal of workplace quotas in
situations where wage is sticky or subject to social scrutiny.
Mentor training. For large mentor capacity q, the tension between talent
recruitment and mentorship efficiency disappears. A nearly fair labor market
emerges both as a stable steady state (Proposition 1), and this composition is
close to optimal (Proposition 3). Thus, the need for market intervention dis-
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appears if mentorship itself can be improved through cross-group exposure,15
mentor training, and networking support for minority youth.16 Our model can
be helpful in highlighting the benefits of increased mentor capacity, but estimating the cost and feasibility of such improvements is mainly an empirical
question.

5

Robustness

Determinants of productivity. We currently assume that productivity
is binary and affected only by schooling. One natural extension is to also
allow for innate talent and mentoring to affect productivity directly, so that
education brings productivity of a worker with talent x and mentorship boost
µ by π1 x+π2 µ+π3 . If firms can observe talent and vary wages by worker, then
their perfect competition ensures that workers still reap their entire individual
1
1
1
c, π̃ = 1+π
π3 and x̃ = 1+π
x
surplus. A change of parameters c̃ = 1+π
1+π2
2
2
can then map this situation into our existing model. Indeed, the mapping
transforms individual surplus
π x + π2 µ + π3 − (c − x − µ) = (1 + π2 )(π̃ − (c̃ − x̃ − µ))
|1
{z
} | {z }
productivity

cost

into a constant multiple of the individual surplus in our standard model with
the new parameters. Since unregulated dynamics and social surplus are both
governed by the sign and relative size of individual surplus, the qualitative
results of our paper carry over unchanged.
15

Dobbin and Kalev (2016) show that programs that increase contact among groups (in
particular formal mentorship programs or voluntary task forces) are most effective in affecting the minority representation among managers. Similarly, Beaman et al. (2009) show
that increased exposure to female leaders (through a quota system) reduces biases.
16
One of the main goals of the presidential initiative “My Brother’s Keeper” is to connect
young men of color to mentoring and support networks (Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the
President on ‘My Brother’s Keeper’ Initiative.” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 Feb 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/
02/27/remarks-president-my-brothers-keeper-initiative).
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Non-additive surplus. One limitation of our approach is the assumption
that talent and mentoring affect surplus additively. One can imagine scenarios
where the effectiveness of a given mentoring relationship depends not only on
the mentor’s group membership or education, but is affected (positively or
negatively) by mentor or mentee talent, and the mentor’s experience as both
a mentor and a mentee.
We share this assumption with Athey et al. (2000), but it is difficult to
relax. Mathematically, the main difficulty is the history-dependence in mentoring and talent, which complicates the steady state analysis. It is, however,
possible to qualitatively anticipate the impact of non-additive surplus under
interventions that maintain a constant labor force. In these interventions, both
the distribution of educated talent and mentor experience are fixed in the long
term. When the minority is over-represented 0.5 < φ < b, the conditional
talent distribution among educated majority workers is left-censored, relative
to that of minority workers, and a typical majority student experiences better mentoring. As such, over-representation is reinforced if low-talent students
have greater returns from mentorship, if there is a negative correlation between
individual talent and mentoring skill, or if poorly mentored students turn into
more “attuned” mentors later in life. The opposite is true if high-talent students are more receptive mentees or if high-talent/well-mentored workers are
more resourceful mentors.
Uneven talent distribution. While we firmly believe that only a model
with equal talent distribution across groups can inform optimal policy, some
situations call for a “conditionally optimal” policy, given the planner’s constraints. For instance, a university may not be able to address systemic differences in access to primary education and may be confronted with sizeable
test gaps across applicants from two groups. Our analysis also has relevance
for the optimal admission policy in these settings. In particular, assume that
the talent distribution F1 of the majority first order stochastically dominates
that of the minority, F2 . Whenever L1 ≥ L2 , the majority has an advantage both mentoring-wise and talent-wise. In an unregulated economy, this
31

would inevitably lead to a bias in favor of the majority analogous to our result
b(1−F1 (x̂))
≥ b denote the
from Proposition 1(c). Yet, letting φ = b(1−F1 (x̂))+(1−b)(1−F
2 (x̂))
share of majority workers that arise from a fair labor force with x̂1 = x̂2 = x̂,
note that Property (M6) implies that for large enough mentor capacity q, the
marginal benefits from an additional minority mentor outweighs those from
an additional majority mentor. In turn, this implies that a bias in favor of the
minority is optimal, which requires persistent intervention. Thus, while the
minority may not be over-represented in the conditionally optimal workforce,
the bias would still be in favor of the minority, and achieving this bias would
still require ongoing intervention.

6

Conclusion

We do not want this paper to be read in isolation. Affirmative action has
many important consequences and we focus primarily on its interaction with
mentoring and its impact on workforce composition. However, we believe
that awareness of the surplus consequences of mentoring complementarities
is crucial for the public discussion. On the most basic level, the insights of
our model are these: People differ in their ability to recruit and mentor top
talent from different socio-demographic backgrounds. Often, mentors are most
effective within their own social group. Like any other skill set, it makes sense
to remunerate group-specific mentoring ability according to the shortness of
its supply and its impact on future surplus. However, such remuneration
does not arise in an unregulated economy due to firm competition because
minority workers do not account for their future positive externalities in their
education decisions. Affirmative action policies, in the form of scholarships
or hiring quotas, can act as a correcting force. To guide the design of the
optimal policy, a keen understanding of wage determination is necessary to
avoid unintended consequences.
Our main contribution is to show that the scale of these externalities can
be far larger than previous models suggest, to the point where they warrant
an on-going subsidy towards the minority that goes beyond a correction of
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historical under-representation. The optimal remuneration often generates a
target workforce that is more diverse than the population, where the net cost
of education is lower for the minority than for the majority. More specifically,
this arises in sectors that require rare skills, and when the marginal mentorship gains from increased representation are larger for the minority than for
the majority. We consider concrete policy instruments to achieve the optimal
workforce composition. We argue in favor of widely available minority scholarships over hiring quotas, and encourage strategies that improve mentorship
and connectivity for minority workers.

A
A.1

Additional Proofs
Mathematical Lemmata

This first lemma serves to simplify notation in subsequent proofs.
Lemma 1. Let m(φ) := µ01(φ) ∇µ̃(φ, 1−φ, φ, 1−φ). Assumptions (M1) to (M4)
imply that the following hold for all φ ∈ (0, 1) and L > 0:
µ0 (φ)
m(φ)
L
m1 (φ) + m3 (φ) = 1 − φ

(10)

m2 (φ) + m4 (φ) = −φ,

(11)

∇µ̃(φL, (1 − φ)L, φL, (1 − φ)L) =

m1 (φ) > 0 ≥ m4 (φ) ≥ m3 (φ)

(9)

(12)

m1 (φ)m3 (1 − φ) ≤ m2 (φ)m4 (1 − φ)

(13)

m1 (φ)m1 (1 − φ) ≥ m2 (φ)m2 (1 − φ).

(14)

Lastly, for any δ > 0, there exists Kδ ∈ R such that km(φ)k∞ < Kδ for all q
and all φ ∈ (δ, 1 − δ).
Proof. The first conditions follows by homogeneity of degree zero (M1):
(M1)

∇µ̃(φL, (1 − φ)L, φL, (1 − φ)L) =

µ0 (φ)
1
∇µ̃(φ, 1 − φ, φ, 1 − φ) =
m(φ).
L
L
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The next two properties follow by homogeneity of degree zero (M1) and the
fact that µ is continuously differentiable:
µ̃(φ + ∆, 1 − φ, φ + ∆, 1 − φ) − µ(φ)
∆→0
∆ · µ0 (φ)

φ+∆
µ φ+∆
− µ(φ)
−φ
(M1)
1+∆
1+∆
= lim
=
lim
= 1 − φ,
∆→0
∆→0
∆ · µ0 (φ)
∆
µ̃(φ, 1 − φ + ∆, φ, 1 − φ + ∆) − µ(φ)
m2 (φ) + m4 (φ) = lim
∆→0
∆ · µ0 (φ)

φ
φ
− µ(φ)
−φ
µ 1+∆
(M1)
1+∆
= lim
=
lim
= −φ.
∆→0
∆→0
∆ · µ0 (φ)
∆
m1 (φ) + m3 (φ) = lim

The sign conditions Property (M2) imply that m1 is positive and m3 , m4 are
negative, and Property (M4) imposes m3 ≤ m4 .
To show Equation (13), note first that the left side is always weakly negative. Thus, the inequality is automatically satisfied whenever m2 (φ) ≤ 0. Otherwise, the result follows from multiplying the two inequalities (M3) and (M4).
Next, Property (M3) imposes m1 ≥ m2 which – as long as both m2 (φ)
and m2 (1 − φ) are positive – directly implies condition (14). When m2 (φ) and
m2 (1 − φ) have opposite signs, inequality (14) holds simply because the left
side is positive and the right side is negative. Finally, when both m2 (φ) and
m2 (1 − φ) are negative, their product is maximal when they both achieve their
lower bound
(11)

(12)

(12)

(11)

m2 (φ) = −φ−m4 (φ) ≥ −φ and m2 (1−φ) = −(1−φ)−m4 (1−φ) ≥ −(1−φ),
implying m2 (φ)m2 (1 − φ) ≤ φ(1 − φ). Since m1 > 0, the left side is minimal
at the lower bound
(10)

(12)

m1 (φ) = 1−φ−m3 (φ) ≥ 1−φ

and

(10)

(12)

m1 (1−φ) = φ−m3 (1−φ) ≥ φ,

hence m1 (φ)m1 (1 − φ) ≥ φ(1 − φ) ≥ m2 (φ)m2 (1 − φ).
Lastly, the boundedness of m stems directly from the boundedness assumption in Property (M7).
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Lemma 2. For any x, y ∈ (limλ→∞ xFλ , ∞), the talent distribution satisfies
1 − Fλ (x)
=1
λ→∞ 1 − Fλ (y)
Z x̄F
λ 1 − F (x)
λ
dx = ∞.
lim
λ→∞ y
1 − Fλ (y)

(15)

lim

(16)

Proof. To show Equation (15), note first that it is without loss of generality
to assume that x ≥ y. By Property (F2), we can then write
1 − Fλ (x)
Fλ (x) − Fλ (y)
1≥
=1−
=1−
1 − Fλ (y)
1 − Fλ (y)
Z x
Fλ0 (t)
λ→∞
≥1−
dt −−−→ 1 + 0.
y 1 − Fλ (t)

Z
y

x

Fλ0 (t)
dt
1 − Fλ (y)

Furthermore, consider any M > 0. Since x̄Fλ → ∞, there exists Λ1 such that
λ (x̃)
> 1/2 for
x̃ := x̄FΛ1 > 2M + y. Furthermore, there exists Λ2 such that 1−F
1−Fλ (y)
all λ > Λ2 . Hence,
Z
y

x̄Fλ

1 − Fλ (x)
1
dx ≥ (x̃ − y) > M
1 − Fλ (y)
2

∀λ > max {Λ1 , Λ2 } ,

which implies Equation (16).

A.2
A.2.1

Relegated proofs
Steady States

We can rewrite Equation (1) as
"
0 = G(Lt , Lt+1 ) :=

#


t+1
Lt+1
− b 1 − F c − 1 − µ̃(Lt1 , Lt2 , Lt+1
1
1 , L2 )
t+1
Lt+1
− (1 − b) 1 − F c − 1 − µ̃(Lt2 , Lt1 , Lt+1
2
2 , L1 )



(17)

which fully describes the evolution of the dynamic system as long as Lt1 , Lt2 >
0. Recall that a steady state L̂ is Lyapunov stable if for all ε > 0, there
exists a δ > 0 such that if kL0 − L̂k < δ, then kLt − L̂k < ε for all t > 0. To
determine whether a steady state L̂ is stable, we will consider the linearization
35

of the system in order to derive a sufficient condition for a steady state to be
stable and a sufficient condition for a steady state not to be stable. To simplify
notation, we write the Jacobian as
∂Lt+1
X(L̂) :=
∂Lt



L̂

∂G
=−
∂Lt+1

−1 

∂G
∂Lt


.
Lt =Lt+1 =L̂

Lemma 3. Let (Γ1 , Γ2 ) ∈ C2 denote the eigenvalues of X(L̂). If |Γi | < 1 for
both i, then L̂ is Lyapunov-stable. If |Γi | > 1 for one i = 1, 2, then L̂ is not
Lyapunov-stable.
Proof. Note that on R2 all norms are equivalent in terms of convergence. Here,
we use the Euclidean norm and denote it by k·k. We first recall that the eigenvalues are equal to the roots of the characteristic (second-order) polynomial
Det(X(L̂) − ΓI). As such, either both roots are real, or they are complex
conjugates of each other. In the case of complex eigenvalues, there exists a coordinate system in which X(L̂) acts as a rotation followed by a multiplication
with |Γ1 | = |Γ2 | (“real canonical form”).
We distinguish between two cases to show both statements.
(i) First assume that Γ1 , Γ2 6= 0. In this case, the discrete version of the
Hartmann-Grobmann Theorem in Zgliczyński et al. (2017) shows that it
is sufficient to consider the linearization of the problem, i.e.
Lt+1 − L̂ = X(L̂)(Lt − L̂).
If |Γ1 |, |Γ2 | < 1, let δ = ε and note that
kL0 − L̂k < ε

=⇒

kX(L̂)t (L0 − L̂)k ≤ max{|Γ1 |, |Γ2 |}t kL0 − L̂k < ε

for all t > 0. Hence, L̂ is Lyapunov-stable.
Next, assume |Γ1 | > 1. If Γ1 is real, let v 1 be the corresponding unit
eigenvector. If it is complex, let v 1 be an arbitrary vector of length one.
Assume that L̂ is Lyaponuv-stable for some ε and δ. Let L0 = L̂ + δ 0 v 1
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for δ 0 < δ, so that ||L0 − L̂|| < δ. Note that
t→∞

kX(L̂)t (L0 − L̂)k = kδ 0 Γt1 v 1 k = δ 0 · |Γ1 |t kv 1 k −−−→ ∞.
In other words, there exists a large enough t such that kX(L̂)t (L0 −L̂)k >
ε, which contradicts the assumption of L̂ being Lyapunov-stable.
(ii) Next, assume that Γ2 = 0 and denote the corresponding eigenvector v 2 .
Then, Γ1 is real. Let the corresponding unit eigenvector be v 1 . Then,
we can write Lt − L̂ = at1 v 1 + at2 v 2 for any t and write the system in the
coordinates v 1 , v 2 as follows:
Lt+1 − L̂ =

Γ1 0
0 0

!

(Lt − L̂) + o kLt − L̂k .

First, consider the case |Γ1 | < 1 and fix an ε > 0. Then, for any η ∈
(|Γ1 |, 1) and for a sufficiently small δ < ε, whenever kL0 − L̂k < δ,
kLt+1 − L̂k ≤ η t kL0 − L̂k < δ < ε by induction over t. Hence, L̂ is
Lyapunov stable.
Next, assume |Γ1 | > 1 and assume that L̂ is Lyapunov-stable. First,
note that for all η ∈ (1, |Γ1 |), kLt − L̂k < ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small
and coordinates with respect to the basis {v 1 , v 2 },

(Lt+1
− L̂1 )2 − (Lt+1
+ L̂2 )2 = Γ21 (Lt1 − L̂1 )2 + o kLt − L̂k2
1
2

≥ η 2 (Lt1 − L̂1 )2 − (Lt2 − L̂2 )2 .

(18)

Consider such an ε > 0, the δ > 0 from the definition of Lyapunov
stability, and any kL0 − L̂k < min{δ, ε} with (L01 − L̂1 )2 − (L02 − L̂2 )2 > 0.
Then, the estimate (18) holds for all t. Hence, lim (Lt1 − L̂1 )2 − (Lt2 −
t→∞

L̂2 )2 = ∞. This contradicts the assumption that kLt − L̂k < ε for all t.
Thus, L̂ cannot be Lyapunov stable.
Next, we apply these findings to the dynamic system from Equation (1)
more concretely. To this end we introduce some more notation. At a steady
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state with composition φ, the group-i labor force is given by the mass of
individuals with talent above x̂i (φ),
L̂1 (φ) := b(1 − F (x̂1 (φ))) and L̂2 (φ) := (1 − b)(1 − F (x̂2 (φ))).

(19)

Since the mentorship boost increases with representation, L̂01 (φ) ≥ 0 ≥ L̂02 (φ)
for all compositions φ ∈ (0, 1). We denote total size by L̂(φ) := L̂1 (φ) + L̂2 (φ).
With a slight abuse of notation we use L̂i to denote both the functions (19)
which is defined for arbitrary compositions and the steady state labor force
participation. We recover the following stability conditions.
Lemma 4. A mixed steady state of composition φ̂ ∈ (0, 1) and size L̂(φ̂) is
stable if both of the following conditions hold:
0 > −L̂(φ̂) + (1 − φ̂)L̂01 (φ̂) − φ̂L̂02 (φ̂)

(20)

0 < 2L̂(φ̂)2 − L̂(φ̂) (1 − φ̂ + m3 (φ̂))L̂01 (φ̂) − (φ̂ + m3 (1 − φ̂)L̂02 (φ̂)



(21)

+ L̂01 (φ̂)L̂02 (φ̂) φ̂(m1 (φ̂) + m2 (1 − φ̂)) + (1 − φ̂)(m1 (1 − φ̂) + m2 (φ̂)) .

If one of the inequalities is reversed, the steady state is unstable.
Proof. At the steady state labor force L̂t = L̂t+1 = (φ̂L̂(φ̂), (1 − φ̂)L̂(φ̂)), we
can write the matrix


∂G
X(φ̂L̂(φ̂), (1 − φ̂)L̂(φ̂)) := −
∂Lt+1

−1 

∂G
∂Lt


Lt =Lt+1 =(φ̂L̂(φ̂),(1−φ̂)L̂(φ̂))

as

−

−1 

1 − L̂01 (φ̂) mL̂(3 (φ̂)φ̂)

−L̂01 (φ̂) mL̂(4 (φ̂)φ̂)

φ̂)
L̂02 (φ̂) m4L̂((1−
φ̂)

φ̂)
1 + L̂02 (φ̂) m3L̂((1−
φ̂)





−L̂01 (φ̂) mL̂(1 (φ̂)φ̂)

−L̂01 (φ̂) mL̂(2 (φ̂)φ̂)

φ̂)
φ̂)
L̂02 (φ̂) m2L̂((1−
L̂02 (φ̂) m1L̂((1−
φ̂)
φ̂)


.

Recall that the possibly complex eigenvalues Γ1 , Γ2 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
Det(X(φ̂L̂(φ̂), (1 − φ̂)L̂(φ̂)) − ΓI) =
38

1
(γ0 + γ1 Γ + γ2 Γ2 )
γ2

with

γ0 = −L̂01 (φ̂)L̂02 (φ̂) m1 (φ̂)m1 (1 − φ̂) − m2 (φ̂)m2 (1 − φ̂) ≥ 0
γ1 = −L̂(φ̂) (L̂01 (φ̂)m1 (φ̂) − L̂02 (φ̂)m1 (1 − φ̂))
− L̂01 (φ̂)L̂02 (φ̂) m1 (φ̂)m3 (1 − φ̂) + m1 (1 − φ̂)m3 (φ̂)

− m2 (φ̂)m4 (1 − φ̂) − m2 (1 − φ̂)m4 (φ̂) ≤ 0

γ2 = L̂(φ̂)2 − L L̂01 (φ̂)m3 (φ̂) − L̂02 (φ̂)m3 (1 − φ̂)

− L̂01 (φ̂)L̂02 (φ̂)(m3 (φ̂)m3 (1 − φ̂) − m4 (φ̂)m4 (1 − φ̂) > 0
Since L̂01 (φ̂) ≥ 0 ≥ L̂02 (φ̂) and L̂(φ̂) = L̂1 (φ̂) + L̂2 (φ̂) > 0 in any steady state,
the signs on the parameters all follow by Lemma 1. Consequently, this is an
upward sloping parabola that is nonnegative and nonincreasing at Γ = 0. If
the function value at Γ = 1 is nonpositive, there exists a root (and hence an
eigenvalue) weakly greater than 1. Thus, a necessary condition for stability is
that
γ0 + γ1 + γ2 = L̂(φ̂)2 − L̂(φ̂) ((1 − φ)L̂01 (φ) − φL̂02 (φ)) > 0,
which after multiplication with 1/L̂(φ̂) > 0 yields Equation (20). Further, if
the characteristic polynomial is nonincreasing and positive at Γ = 1, the vertex
of the parabola and any real roots are at least one 1. (The vertex corresponds
to the real part of any complex eigenvalues.) Thus, another necessary condition
is that the derivative at Γ = 1 is positive, γ1 + 2γ2 > 0, as in Equation (21).
If both conditions (20) and (21) hold, the vertex of the polynomial and
any real eigenvalues are strictly contained between 0 and 1. Any complex
eigenvalues Γ = a ± bi with b > 0, solve
(

γ0 + aγ1 + (a2 − b2 )γ2 = 0
bγ1 + 2abγ2 = 0
⇔ γ1 = −2γ2 a

because the real and imaginary part of the quadratic function at those values
√
must be zero where |Γi | = a2 + b2 . Hence, |Γi | < 1 if and only if a2 + b2 =
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γ0
γ2

< 1 which is equivalent to γ2 − γ0 > 0. This follows from γ0 + γ1 + γ2 > 0
and γ1 + 2γ2 > 0, so it follows from Equation (20) and Equation (21). Hence,
these two conditions are necessary and sufficient for |Γi | < 1.
Taken together, we have shown that Equations (20) and (21) are both
necessary and jointly sufficient to ensure that |Γi | < 1 for both i = 1, 2; as a
result, the steady state is stable. It also follows that if either of the inequalities
Equation (20) or Equation (21) is strictly reversed, that there is an eigenvalue
with |Γi | > 1, which implies that the steady state is not stable.
For the proof of Proposition 1, it is useful to define the majority over-supply
as
Ψ(φ) := (1 − φ)L̂1 (φ) − φL̂2 (φ),

(22)

noting that (17) is satisfied at (L1 , L2 ) = (φL, (1−φ)L) if and only if Ψ(φ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove each claim in turn.
(a) Let φ := min {φ ∈ [0, 1] | µ(φ) ≥ c − π − x̄F } denote the minimal owngroup share to ensure participation of most able individuals. In a homogeneous labor force φ ∈ {0, 1}, the dominant group is always willing to invest
because φ < 0.5 by Property (F1). A homogeneous workforce constitutes
a steady state whenever it is a best response for the dominated group not
to invest whenever φ ≥ 0, which is equivalent to Property (hSS). The
steady state is stable whenever φ > 0, since small enough perturbations
maintain the share of the underrepresented group below the threshold.
(b) Recall that we know from Section A.2.1 that the roots of the majority
over-supply function Ψ identify the steady states of the economy. The
function Ψ is continuous and
Ψ(b) = (1 − b)b [F (c − 1 − µ(1 − b)) − F (c − 1 − µ(b))] ≥ 0

(23)

by monotonicity of µ. When Property (hSS) is satisfied, L̂1 (φ) = 0 and
the change in sign Ψ(φ) < 0 ≤ Ψ(b) implies that Ψ admits a root over
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(φ̄, b]. When Property (hSS) is not satisfied, then Ψ(1) = −L̂2 (1) < 0,
and the change in sign between Ψ(b) ≥ 0 > Ψ(1) ensures a root over [b, 1).
(c) Assume that the senior workforce is dominated by the majority, L1 > L2 .
We first assume by contradiction that the opposite is true for the junior
workforce, `1 ≤ `2 . In that case, majority juniors receive better mentoring
than minority juniors,
(M4)

(M3)

µ̃(L1 , L2 , `1 , `2 ) ≥ µ̃ (L1 , L2 , `2 , `1 ) ≥ µ̃ (L2 , L1 , `2 , `1 ) .
Since b > 1 − b, Equation (1) then implies that the individually rational
participation is larger for the majority than for the minority, contradicting
the assumption that `1 ≤ `2 . As a result, the junior workforce is also
dominated by the majority.
To show that the system eventually settles on a workforce that is not just
dominated by the majority, but biased in favor of the majority, we now
show that there are no steady states of composition (0.5, b]. To do so, note
that for φ > 0.5, we have x̂1 (φ) < x̂2 (φ). Hence, for φ ∈ (0.5, b] we have
Ψ(φ) = (1−φ)b(1−F (x̂1 (φ))−φ(1−b)(1−F (x̂2 (φ)) > (b−φ)(1−F (x̂2 (φ)) > 0.
Since Ψ admits no root over that range, the system converges to a steady
state that is biased in favor of the majority.
(d) First, we show that for any δ > 0, there exists Q > 0 such that the
economy admits a stable steady state with composition φ ∈ [b, b + δ)
whenever q > Q. Indeed, let L̄ = 1 − F (c − π − 1) denote the size of
the labor force if everyone receives the maximal mentoring boost. Since
lim µq (b + δ) = 1 by Property (M5), note that
q→∞

lim L̂1 (b + δ) = bL̄ and

q→∞
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lim L̂2 (b + δ) = (1 − b)L̄

q→∞

(24)

and hence
lim Ψ(b + δ) = (1 − b − δ)bL̄ − (b + δ)(1 − b)L̄ = −δ L̄ < 0.

q→∞

Since Ψ is continuous and Ψ(b) ≥ 0 by Equation (23), this implies a
downward crossing over [b, b + δ) for q larger than some threshold Q1 (i.e.,
Ψ(φ−ε) > Ψ(φ) = 0 > Ψ(φ+ε) for a φ ∈ [b, b+δ) and all ε > 0 sufficiently
small). In addition, the downward slope Ψ0 (φ) < 0 is equivalent to the
first stability condition in Lemma 4. In order to show the second stability
condition (21), note that the convergence of µ0q (φ) → 0 is uniform over
[b, b + δ] by Dini’s Theorem17 and in turn implies uniform convergence of
L̂0i (φ) → 0 for either group i. By Lemma 1, |mk (φ)| admit an upper bound
M that is independent of k, φ and q. As a consequence, the right side of
Equation (21) converges to 2L̄2 > 0, implying that there exists Q2 such
that the economy admits a stable steady state within [b, b + δ) whenever
q > max {Q1 , Q2 }.
Finally, we rule out any other steady states for q large enough. By Property (M5), lim L̂1 (δ) = bL̄ and lim L̂2 (δ) = (1 − b)L̄. By the definition
q→∞

q→∞

of L̄, both sequences approach the limit from below. Hence, there exists
a Q3 so that for all q > Q3 ,

L̂1 (δ) ∈



δ
L̄, bL̄
b−
b+δ


and L̂2 (1−δ) ∈



δ
1−b−
L̄, (1 − b)L̄ .
b+δ

Since µ is increasing, we have L̂1 (φ) ∈ [L̂1 (δ), bL̄] and L̂2 (φ) ∈ [L̂2 (1 −
δ), (1 − b)L̄] for all φ ∈ [δ, 1 − δ]. In turn, these bounds imply


δ
δ
Ψ(φ) ∈ (b − φ)L̄ − (1 − φ)
L̄, (b − φ)L̄ + φ
L̄ .
b+δ
b+δ
At any root of Ψ, this range must contain zero. Rewriting that condition
17

Dini’s Theorem states that if a monotone sequence of continuous functions converges
pointwise on a compact space, and if the limit function is also continuous, then the convergence is uniform.
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in terms of φ, we obtain the equivalent expression for any root φ:

φ∈

2b − 1
b−δ+δ
,b + δ
b


⊆ (b − δ, b + δ).

In other words, for q > Q3 , the only roots of Ψ are either almost homogeneous φ ∈ [0, δ) ∪ (1 − δ, 1] or almost fair φ ∈ (b − δ, b + δ).
(e) First, we show that there exists a Λ1 ≥ 0 so that for all λ > Λ1 , there is a
steady state in [b, b + δ). To this end, note that Lemma 2 implies that
lim

λ→∞

L̂1 (φ)
L̂2 (φ)

b(1 − F (x̂1 (φ)))
b
=
λ→∞ (1 − b)(1 − F (x̂2 (φ)))
1−b

= lim

∀φ ∈ [0, 1]

(25)

and hence

lim

λ→∞

Ψ(b + δ)
L̂1 (b + δ) + L̂2 (b + δ)

= lim

(1 − b − δ) L̂L̂1 (b+δ)
− (b + δ)
(b+δ)

λ→∞

2

L̂1 (b+δ)
L̂2 (b+δ)

= −δ < 0.

+1

In other words, there exists Λ1 such that this ratio is negative for all
(23)

λ > Λ1 . This in turn implies Ψ(b + δ) < 0 ≤ Ψ(b), and thus Ψ has a
downward crossing root over [b, b + δ) for all λ > Λ1 , i.e. there is a steady
state which satisfies the first condition (20) of Lemma 4.
Next, we show that there exists a Λ2 ≥ 0 so that for λ > max{Λ1 , Λ2 }, all
such steady states in [b, b + δ) are stable. Since it is a downward crossing,
we only need to show that the second condition Equation (21) of Lemma 4
is satisfied. The continuous functions µ0 (φ) and mk (φ) are all bounded over
the compact interval [b, b + δ]. Property (F2) then implies that
lim

λ→∞

L̂01 (φ)
L̂1 (φ)

F 0 (x̂1 (φ))µ0 (φ) (F2)
= 0
λ→∞ 1 − F (x̂1 (φ))

= lim

for all φ ∈ [b, b + δ], and the convergence is uniform by Dini’s Theorem.
Dividing Equation (21) by L2 > 0, note that the right side converges to 2 as
λ → ∞. In other words, there exists Λ2 big enough such that the economy
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admits a stable steady state within [b, b + δ) whenever λ > max {Λ1 , Λ2 }.
Furthermore, the convergence in Equation (25) is uniform by Dini’s Theorem, implying that there exists Λ3 large enough such that






b
b
∈ (1 − φ)
− ε − φ, (1 − φ)
+ε −φ
1−b
1−b
L̂2 (φ)
Ψ(φ)

∀φ ∈ [0, 1]

δ
At any root of Ψ, this range must contain zero. Letting ε = (1−b)(1−b+δ)
and
rewriting the condition in terms of φ, we obtain the equivalent expression


φ ∈ b − δ, b +

1−b
δ
1 − b + 2δ


⊆ (b − δ, b + δ).

In other words, for λ > Λ3 , the only roots of Ψ are almost fair with
composition φ ∈ (b − δ, b + δ).

A.2.2

Optimal labor force composition

Let L∗ : [0, 1] ⇒ [0, ∞) and S ∗ : [0, 1] → R be defined from Equation (3) as
L∗ (φ) = arg max S(φ, L)
L≥0

and

S ∗ (φ) = max S(φ, L).
L≥0

We refer to the cutoffs under composition φ and labor force size L as x̂1 =


L . When L = L∗ (φ) is optimal for
F −1 1 − φb L and x̂2 = F −1 1 − 1−φ
1−b
composition φ, we write the cutoffs as x∗1 and x∗2 . The first result in Lemma 5
establishes uniqueness of the maximizer, and we abuse notation by referring
to its unique element as L∗ (φ).
Lemma 5. The functions L∗ and S ∗ satisfy the following properties:
(a) L∗ (φ) is singleton-valued and strictly positive for all φ ∈ [0, 1].
(b) At the optimal composition φ∗ = arg maxφ S ∗ (φ), a positive mass of each
group abstains from participation, x∗1 , x∗2 > xF .
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(c) Whenever x∗1 , x∗2 > xF , optimal surplus S ∗ and its derivative S ∗ 0 can be
written as
Z x̄
Z x̄
∗
S (φ) = b
(1 − F (x))dx + (1 − b)
(1 − F (x))dx,
(26)
x∗1

x∗2

S ∗ 0 (φ) = L∗ (φ) (µ(φ)−µ(1−φ) + φµ0 (φ)−(1−φ)µ0 (1−φ)−x∗1 −x∗2 )

(27)

where x∗1 and x∗2 solve
0 = π − c + φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ) + φx∗1 + (1 − φ)x∗2
b
1−b
L∗ (φ) = (1 − F (x∗1 )) =
(1 − F (x∗2 )).
φ
1−φ

(28)
(29)

(d) S ∗ has the following properties:
Zx̄

∗

(1 − F (x))dx

S (1) = b

(30)

c−π−µ(1)

S ∗ (b) =

Zx̄
(1 − F (x))dx

(31)

c−π−bµ(b)−(1−b)µ(1−b)

S ∗ 0 (1) = b(1 − F (c − π − µ(1)) (c − π − µ(0) + µ0 (1) − x̄F )

(32)

S ∗ 0 (b) = L∗ (b)(µ(b) + bµ0 (b) − µ(1 − b) − (1 − b)µ0 (1 − b))

(33)

∗0

(34)

S (0.5) = L∗ (0.5)(x∗1 (0.5) − x∗2 (0.5)) ≥ 0,
where x∗1 (φ) = F −1 (1 − φb L∗ (φ)) and x∗2 (φ) = F −1 (1 −

1−φ ∗
L (φ)).
1−b

At any steady state (φ̂, L̂),
Zx̄

Zx̄
(1 − F (x))dx + (1 − b)

S(φ̂, L̂) = b

c−π−µ(φ̂)
∗0



(1 − F (x))dx

(35)

c−π−µ(1−φ̂)

0

0



S (φ̂) = L̂ φ̂µ (φ̂) − (1 − φ̂)µ (1 − φ̂) .
Proof. We prove each claim in turn:
45

(36)

(a) First, note that we can write
Z

1

S(φ, L) = b

π − c + F −1 (y) + µ(φ)dy

1− φb L

Z

1

π − c + F −1 (y) + µ(1 − φ)dy.

+(1 − b)
1− 1−φ
L
1−b

Hence, we have
∂
S (φ, L) = π − c + M (φ) + φx̂1 + (1 − φ)x̂2
∂L
∂
S (φ, L) = L (M 0 (φ) + x̂1 − x̂2 )
∂φ

(37)
(38)

where M (φ) = φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ) is as defined in (4), but we omit
the subscript in this proof. Furthermore, surplus is strictly concave in L
for any φ,
(1 − φ)2
∂2
φ2
1
1
−
S(φ,
L)
=
−
φ
2
∂L
b F 0 (F −1 (1 − b L))
1 − b F 0 (F −1 (1 −

1−φ
L))
1−b

< 0,

ensuring a unique solution.
(b) Positive size L is always optimal since
∂
S(φ, 0) = π − c + x̄F + M (φ) ≥ π − c + x̄F + µ(0.5) > 0
∂L
by Property (F1). When a compositions severely over-represents one group
i and talent dispersion is high, it may be optimal to set x∗i = xF , as this
allows for the participation of opposite-group members with high individual surplus. Note, however, that at the cutoffs (x∗1 , x∗2 ) that are optimal

46

under composition φ, Equations (37) and (38) jointly imply
∂
S (φ, L) L=L∗ (φ) = L (M 0 (φ) + x∗1 − x∗2 )
∂φ


L
∂
0
∗
=
(1 − φ)M (φ) + M (φ) + x1 + π − c − S (φ, L)
(39)
{z
} ∂L
1−φ |
(T1 )

L
=−
φ



0

φM (1 − φ) + M (1 − φ) +
|
{z

x∗2

(T2 )


∂
+ π − c − S (φ, L) , (40)
} ∂L

where we used the fact that M (φ) = M (1 − φ). If the optimal labor size
∂
L∗ (φ) employs all members of group i, then ∂L
S (φ, L) L=L∗ (φ) ≥ 0 and
x∗i = xF . By assumption Property (F1) on the lower bound xF , the term
Ti in the expression above is strictly negative. When i = 1, Equation (39)
∂
implies that ∂φ
S (φ, L) L=L∗ (φ) < 0, and when i = 2, Equation (40) implies
∂
S (φ, L) L=L∗ (φ) > 0. In either case, a marginal adjustment in composi∂φ
tion strictly improves surplus. This ensures that all cutoffs are interior at
the optimal composition.
∂
S(φ, L) L=L∗ (φ) , which imposes
(c) For any interior maximum, we have 0 = ∂L
∗
condition (28) on the optimal cutoffs x1 and x∗2 . The second condition
(29) merely restates the definition in Equation (3).

(d) By Fubini’s Theorem, we can write
Z

x̄

x∗i

(x−x∗i )F 0 (x)dx

Z

x̄

Z

x

=

Z

0

x̄

Z

F (x)dtdx =
x∗i

x∗1

0

Z

x̄

F (x)dxdt =
x∗i
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x̄

t

(1−F (x))dx
x∗i

and hence
S(φ, L) = L (π − c + φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ))
+ bx∗1 (1 − F (x∗1 )) + (1 − b)x∗2 (1 − F (x∗2 ))
Z x̄
Z x̄
∗
0
(x − x∗2 )F 0 (x)dx
(x − x1 )F (x)dx + (1 − b)
+b
x∗2

x∗1

= L (π − c + φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ) + φx∗1 + (1 − φ)x∗2 )
Z x̄
Z x̄
+b
(1 − F (x))dx + (1 − b)
(1 − F (x))dx.
x∗1

x∗2

This implies Equation (35) and, together with (28), we obtain Equation (26) By the Envelope Theorem, we obtain S ∗ 0 (φ) = ∂S
(φ, L∗ (φ))
∂φ
and hence (27).
At composition φ = 1, we have x∗2 = x̄F . By Equation (28), x∗1 = c − π −
µ(1). By Equation (29), L∗ (1) = b(1 − F (c − π − µ(1)). Plugging this into
Equation (26) yields (30), and plugging it into Equation (27) yields (32).
(28)

At composition φ = b, we have x∗1 = x∗2 = F −1 (1 − L∗ (b)) = c − π −
φµ(b) − (1 − b)µ(1 − b). Plugging this into Equation (26) yields (31), and
plugging it into Equation (27) yields (33).
At any steady state (φ̂, L̂), Equation (28) holds since the participation
constraint (IR) is binding at x∗1 and x∗2 , and thus L̂ = L∗ (φ̂) and x∗1 − x∗2 =
µ(1− φ̂)−µ(φ̂). Plugging this into Equation (26) yields (35), and plugging
it into Equation (27) yields (36).

Proof of Proposition 2. In Proposition 1, we establish the existence of a
stable steady state arbitrarily close to composition b for large enough q or λ.
The surplus of that steady state is given by Equation (35) in Lemma 5 and
converges to
Z
lim b

q→∞

x̄

Z
(1 − F (x))dx + (1 − b)

c−π−µ(b)

x̄

Z
(1 − F (x))dx =

c−π−µ(1−b)
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x̄

(1 − F (x))dx > 0
c−π−1

as q → ∞. Conversely, the surplus of the best homogeneous steady state φ̂ = 1
converges to
Z
Z
x̄

x̄

lim b

q→∞

(1 − F (x))dx = b
c−π−µ(1)

(1 − F (x))dx
c−π−1

by Equation (31). Since b < 1, the nearly fair mixed stable steady state
eventually yields a higher surplus than any homogeneous steady state.
As for λ → ∞, the results follows simply because there are no homogeneous steady states for λ large enough by Proposition 1(e).

Proof of Proposition 3. We prove each claim in turn:
(a) Property (F1) implies that µq (0.5) > c − π − x̄F for at least some q > 0.
Let us denote such a q by q̃. Since limq→0 µq (0.5) = 0 by Property (M5)
and 0 < c − π − x̄F , the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees the
existence of q0.5 ∈ (0, q̃) such that µq0.5 (0.5) = c − π − x̄F . Consider now
what happens when q < q0.5 . Since µ is strictly increasing in φ and q,
any participating member of the minority group has negative individual
surplus, 0 > π − c + x + µq (1 − φ). Excluding group 2 from the workforce
also improves the mentorship boost for the majority, and hence the optimal
labor force is homogeneous. Since µq0.5 (1) > c − π − x̄F , there exists a
nonempty range of q < q0.5 where the most talented majority members
generate positive surplus under φ = 1, and thus ensure a strictly positive
size of the workforce.
(b) First, we establish that for b > 0.5, the optimal workforce is always weakly
dominated by the majority, φ∗ ≥ 0.5. Indeed, using a change of variables,
we can write the surplus from Equation (3) as
S(φ, L) = L(π − c + x + φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ))


Z 1−φ
Z φ

y
y 
−1
−1
F
1−
L dy.
+L
F
1 − L dy + L
b
1−b
0
0
Consider now any labor force (φL, (1 − φ)L) for some φ < 0.5, and com49

pare its surplus to that of labor force ((1 − φ)L, φL). The two quantities differ only in the range of integration for the last two terms. Since


q
F −1 1 − qb L > F −1 1 − 1−b
L pointwise, surplus is strictly higher for
the labor force that is dominated by the majority.
Next, we show that the optimal labor force is biased in favor of the minority
for q large enough. We show this in two steps.
First, by the expressions for S ∗ (b) and S ∗ (1) in Lemma 5,
R x̄
b c−π−1 (1 − F (x))dx
S ∗ (1)
= R x̄
= b < 1.
lim
q→∞ S ∗ (b)
(1 − F (x))dx
c−π−1
Consequently, there exists Q1 ∈ R such that the optimal workforce is
mixed for all q > Q1 .
Next, we show that there exists a Q2 > 0 so that for q > max{Q1 , Q2 }, a
fair labor force generates higher surplus than one with a bias in favor of
the majority, S ∗ (b) > S ∗ (φ) for all φ > b. To that end, we define
Z

x̄

Z

c−π−1

(1 −

(1 − F (x))dx +

ε :=

x∗1 ∞

c−π−1

Z

F (x∗1 ∞ ))dx

x̄

(1 − F (x))dx,

−
x∗1 ∞

where (x∗1 ∞ , x∗2 ∞ ) denotes the limiting cutoffs for q → ∞. Note that in
any mixed workforce of composition φ, x∗1 ∞ and x∗2 ∞ satisfy
0 = π − c + 1 + φx∗1 ∞ + (1 − φ)x∗2 ∞ ,
b
1−b
(1 − F (x∗1 ∞ )) =
(1 − F (x∗2 ∞ )),
φ
1−φ

(41)
(42)

due to constraints (28) and (29). Whenever φ > b, the limiting cutoff
is lower for the majority group, x∗1 ∞ < x∗2 ∞ , by Equation (42) and by
Equation (41), it also follows that x∗1 ∞ < c − π − 1 < x∗2 ∞ . Together with
monotonicity of F , this implies that ε is positive,
Z
ε>

x̄

Z

c−π−1

(1 − F (x))dx +
c−π−1

Z

x̄

(1 − F (x))dx −
x∗1 ∞

(1 − F (x))dx > 0.
x∗1 ∞
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The same is true for δ := b 2ε .
Moreover, since F is bounded and µ(φ) → 1 pointwise, there exists Q2 ∈ R
such that for all q > Q2
(Z

x∗i ∞

Z
(1 − F (x))dx ,

max

)

c−π−1

(1 − F (x))dx

x∗i

c−π−bµ(b)−(1−b)µ(1−b)

< δ.

(43)

i=1,2

We will use this to generate an upper bound for the surplus expression
(26) for any φ > b. Indeed, note that
x̄

Z

x̄

Z
(1 − F (x))dx < δ +

x∗1

Z

c−π−1

(1 − F (x∗1 ∞ ))dx − ε (44)

(1 − F (x))dx +

x∗1 ∞

c−π−1

and similarly,
Z

x̄

Z

x̄

(1 − F (x))dx < δ +
x∗2

Z

x∗2 ∞

(1 − F (x))dx −
c−1−π

c−1−π

Z

x̄

Z

>1−F (x∗2 ∞ )

x∗2 ∞

(1 − F (x))dx −

<δ+

(1 − F (x)) dx
| {z }

(1 − F (x∗2 ∞ ))dx.

(45)

c−1−π

c−1−π

Note also that by Equations (41) and (42),
(41)

= (1−φ)(x∗ ∞ −x∗ ∞ )

Z
b

1
z
}|2
{
∗∞
∗∞
(1 − F (x1 ))dx = b(1 − F (x1 )) (c − π − 1 − x∗1 ∞ )

c−π−1

x∗1 ∞
(42)

= (1 − b)(1 −

F (x∗2 ∞ )) φ(x∗2 ∞
|

−
{z

x∗1 ∞ )
}

(41) ∗ ∞
= x2 −(c−π−1)
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Z
= (1 − b)

x∗2 ∞

(1 − F (x∗2 ∞ ))dx.

c−π−1

We conclude that for all q > Q2 and φ > b,
∗

Z

x̄

Z

x̄

(1 − F (x))dx + (1 − b)

S (φ) = b
x∗1

(1 − F (x))dx by (26)
x∗2

Z
< δ − bε +

x̄

(1 − F (x))dx

by (44) and (45)

c−π−1
Z x̄

< 2δ − bε +

(1 − F (x))dx

by (43)

c−π−bµ(b)−(1−b)µ(1−b)

= S ∗ (b)

by (31).

This shows that over-representation of the majority is suboptimal for any
q > max {Q1 , Q2 }. The optimal composition is thus contained in [0.5, b].
For b > 0.5, we can rule out the boundaries of this interval. Indeed,
Equation (33) implies that S ∗ 0 (b) has the same sign as
µq (b) + bµ0q (b) − µq (1 − b) − (1 − b)µ0q (1 − b).
By Property (M6), this is negative for all q above a threshold Q3 . Together
with the strict inequality in Equation (34), this implies that the optimal
composition is in (0.5, b) whenever q > max {Q1 , Q2 , Q3 }.
(c) The optimal composition satisfies the first order condition S ∗ 0 (φ), which
by Equation (27) implies that
0 = µ(φ) − µ(1 − φ) + φµ0 (φ) − (1 − φ)µ0 (1 − φ) + x∗1 − x∗2

(46)

Since all but the last two terms disappear as q → ∞, the only way both
this and the two conditions (41) and (42) can be satisfied is if x∗1 ∞ =
x∗2 ∞ = c − π − 1 and φ = b. By continuity of the derivatives, the optimal
composition therefore converges to b.
Finally, we consider the impact of high talent dispersion λ on the optimal labor force composition. Our proof relies on three observations: First,
a homogeneous workforce is suboptimal for large enough λ. This can most
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easily be seen from Equation (32), which shows that S 0 (1) is negative whenever x∗F > c − π − µ(0) + µ0 (1). Second, any interior optimum has to solve
S ∗ 0 (φ) = 0, which together with Equations (28) and (29) identifies all local
extrema. Letting M (φ) := φµ(φ) + (1 − φ)µ(1 − φ), Equations (27) and (28)
imply that marginal talent is equal to
x∗1 = c − π − M (φ) − (1 − φ)M 0 (φ)

and

x∗2 = c − π − M (φ) + φM 0 (φ)

at the optimal composition φ. Both expressions are independent of λ, and
in the support of the talent function for large enough λ by Property (F1).
Continuity of µ0 implies that whenever M 0 (b) < 0, there exists δ > 0 such
that M 0 (φ) < 0 for all φ ∈ [b, b + δ). The optimal composition has to satisfy
Equation (29), which yields

φ=

1 − b 1 − F (c − π − M (φ) + φM 0 (φ))
1+
b 1 − F (c − π − M (φ) − (1 − φ)M 0 (φ))

−1
.

When M 0 (φ) < 0 the right side is strictly smaller than b, ruling out any
solutions over [b, b + δ). Moreover, Equation (15) implies that the right side
converges to b as λ → ∞. The convergence is uniform by Dini’s Theorem. For
λ large enough, this rules out any solutions larger than φ ≥ b + δ.
Conversely, whenever M 0 (b) > 0, the same argument rules out solutions
over some interval (b − δ 0 , b] and then restricts crossings to a δ 0 -ball around b
for λ large enough. For high enough talent dispersion, Equation (7) therefore
identifies the threshold q that determines the bias of the optimal labor force.
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